Abstract-Source IP spoofing attacks are critical issues to the Internet. These attacks are considered to be sent from bot infected hosts. There has been active research on IP traceback technologies. However, the traceback from an end victim host to an end spoofing host has not yet been achieved, due to the lack of traceback probes installed on each routing path. There is a need to replace alternative probes in order to reduce the installation cost. In this research, we propose an IP tracking scheme against bots using the DNS logs. Many types of bots retrieve IP addresses from fully qualified domain names (FQDNs) at the beginning of communication. The proposed scheme checks from the destination to the source DNS logs, in order to extract the bots. Also, we propose means to distinguish spoofing from non-spoofing attacks, and how to obtain reliable of tracking results. We collect bot communication patterns to confirm that the DNS log can be used for reasonable probes and for achieving a high tracking success rate.
INTRODUCTION
Source IP spoofing attacks are critical issues to the Internet. These attacks are considered to be sent from bot infected hosts that are controlled via command and control (C&C) servers. There has been active research on IP traceback systems. For example, a method involving ICMP traceback messages [1] that fills information concerning a spoofing packet, a packet marking method [2] , [3] that fills router identification in a packet header, and a digest method [4] that records and retrieves the hash values of packets on each router have been proposed. However, no traceback from an end victim host to an end spoofing host has yet been achieved, due to the lack of traceback probes installed on each routing path. In a serial traceback scheme, the end-to-end traceback success rate may decrease with the cumulative power order of the failure rate on each routing hop [5] . Many probes should be installed on each domain in order to achieve a high end-to-end traceback success rate. Therefore, there is a need to replace them with alternative probes in order to reduce the installation cost.
In this research, we propose an IP tracking scheme against the bots using DNS query logs that can be output from conventional DNS servers. Because many types of bot retrieve IP addresses from the FQDNs of the victim at the beginning of communication, we can track the bots from the DNS query logs. The proposed scheme checks from the destination DNS to the source DNS (generally called a resolver) logs, in order to extract the IP addresses of the bots. Also, we propose methods to distinguish spoofing from non-spoofing attacks, which can retain the privacy of a communication pair from non-participant domains. Furthermore, we consider how to obtain reliable tracking results, involving the matching of a few DNS logs and extraction of common IP addresses of the bots. We collect the bot communication patterns to confirm that the DNS log can be used for reasonable probes and for achieving a high tracking success rate.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a survey of conventional IP traceback studies. Section III investigates the bot communication patterns, especially DNS queries. Section IV proposes an IP traceback schemes against IP spoofing attacks from the bot using DNS query logs. Section V evaluates the end-to-end traceback success rate. Section VI explains further studies. And finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. CONVENTIONAL STUDIES

A. IP Traceback
In this section, we survey the conventional traceback schemes, namely the ICMP, the packet marking, and the hashbased traceback.
In the case of the ICMP traceback [1] , the probe samples packets and calculates a packet digest that is sent to the destination host with the probe identification using an ICMP packet. The destination host receives the ICMP packets and depicts the routing path according to the digests and the probe identifications. The disadvantages of the ICMP traceback scheme are as follows: many probes should be installed on the Internet, many digests and probe identifications should be collected to depict the routing path, and the ICMP traceback packets load to the destination host.
In the case of the packet marking scheme [2] , [3] , the probe identification is inserted in the packet header that is not used for the Internet routing. The destination host receives the packets and extracts the probe identification in order to depict the routing path. The disadvantages of the packet marking scheme are as follows: many probes need to be installed on the Internet, many probe identifications need to be collected, and many insertion conflicts occur with other probes due to the limitation of the un-used header area.
In the case of the hash-based scheme [4] , the probe records the digest of the packet. When the destination host requests a traceback, the probes on the routing path retrieve the digests. If the same digest is retrieved, the packet is exchanged on the probe. The disadvantages of the hash-based scheme are as follows: many probes should be installed on the Internet and the capacity of a probe HDD should be considerable in order to record the packet digests for as long as possible.
III. INVESTIGATION OF BOT COMMUNICATION PATTERN
The bot is controlled by C&C servers and sends attack packets to the victim hosts. In this section, we investigate these bot communication patterns, especially DNS queries. We have collected 44 kinds of bot code using the honeypot [6] and infected a virtual machine [7] . Thirth-seven kinds of bot communicated with outside hosts, while the 7 kinds of bot were not active on the virtual machine. Figure 1 shows an example of a bot communication pattern whereby DNS queries are extracted between the bot and the primary DNS server [8] . The bot sent recursive DNS queries that retrieved 4 kinds of FQDN, which included both the victim hosts and the C&C servers. Figure 2 shows an example of a DNS query pattern from a spam-mail bot. The spam-mail bot turned into a DNS resolver and sent DNS queries to retrieve the MX records of each domain. Figure 3 shows a screen shot of the communication pattern visualizer [9] that depicts the communication pattern between the bot and the DNS servers shown in Figure 2 . The spam-mail bot accessed many domain DNS servers in order to retrieve the MX records. Table 1 shows the DNS query rate to retrieve the IP addresses of the victim hosts and the C&C servers. Twentynine kinds of bot sent DNS queries in order to resolve the IP addresses of the victim hosts, while all 37 kinds of bot sent DNS queries to resolve the IP addresses of the C&C servers. Following the DNS queries, the bot communicates with the victim hosts and the C&C servers. 
IV. IP TRACEBACK USING DNS LOG AGAINST BOTS
In this section, we propose an IP tracking scheme for the bots, including source IP spoofing attacks, by using the DNS logs. One assumption of our scheme is that the attacker retrieves IP address from the DNS server before sending spoofing packets.
A. Review of the DNS Query Model
We review the typical DNS query model shown in Figure  4 . The source host sends a recursive query packet to a source DNS server in order to retrieve the IP address of the FQDN. The source DNS server will be a resolver and resolves the FQDN by retrieving a DNS tree. Figure 5 shows an example of the source DNS log. The log records the IP address of the source host linked with the destination FQDN.
I
A source host sends a recursive query www.kddi.com to a source DNS server that will be a resolver.
II
The source DNS server sends iterative queries .com to the root DNS, kddi.com to the region DNS, and www.kddi.com to the destination DNS servers.
III
The destination DNS server replies the IP address xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx of the destination FQDN www.kddi.com to the source DNS server.
IV
The source DNS server responds with the resolved IP address xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx to the source host. 
B. IP Traceback for Regular Recursive DNS Query
We propose an IP tracking scheme that cooperates the source DNS server with the destination DNS server shown in Figures 6 and 7 . Here, the root and region DNS servers are abbreviated. Tags "I,…,IV" represent the same procedures as shown in Figure 4 , while the proposed IP tracking procedures are as follows: 
C. IP Traceback for Forwarding DNS Query
Several source DNS servers are configured for DNS forwarding [10] . A forwarder DNS server for the source DNS server will be a DNS resolver. In this case, the DNS query log of the destination DNS server records the IP address of the forwarder DNS server instead of the source DNS server. Thus, there is a need to track additional hops to the source DNS server. Figure 8 shows the tracking model using three DNS server logs.
1. The same procedures as shown in Figure 6 . 2. The same procedures as shown in Figure 6 . The IP tracking request is relayed to the forwarder DNS server. 3. The forwarder DNS server inspects its recursive DNS events to extract the IP address of the source DNS server and relays the IP tracking request. 4. The same procedures as shown in Figure 6 . The IP tracking result is replied to the forwarder DNS server. 5. The forwarder DNS server relays the IP tracking result to the destination DNS server. 6. The same procedures as shown in Figure 6 .
Following this section, we do not consider the DNS forwarding model to focus on the primary schemes. 
D. Reduction of False Positives
When many source hosts retrieve the FQDN of the destination host simultaneously, it is difficult to distinguish between legitimate hosts and attackers. With this in mind, we consider how to reduce the false positives of the source IP tracking. The approaches to false positive reduction are applied at both the source and the destination DNS servers.
1) Extracting the Attacker at the Source DNS Server
When the attacker shown in Figure 1 retrieves the FQDNs of some victims, the source DNS server receives certain IP tracking requests from the destination DNS servers in the short term. The source DNS log includes a common source IP address considered to be the attacker. Figure 9 shows the false reduction model at the source DNS server. 
2) Extracting Attacker at the Destination DNS Server
When the attacker shown in Figure 2 sends the DNS query to certain source DNS servers, the destination DNS server receives common DNS queries from the source DNS servers. If the IP tracking results replied to the destination DNS server include the common source host, the source IP address is considered to be the attacker. Figure 10 shows the false reduction model at the destination DNS server.
1. When the destination host receives the source IP spoofing packets, an IP tracking request is sent from the destination host to the destination DNS server. 2. The destination DNS server inspects his recursive DNS events in order to extract the source DNS servers who resolve the victim FQDN. Moreover, the IP tracking requests are relayed from the destination DNS server to some source DNS servers. 
E. Spoofing/Non-spoofing Confirmation with Keeping the Privacy
It is important to confirm that the source IP address of the attack packet is spoofed. Because if the source IP address of the attack packet is not spoofed, the IP tracking request discloses communication privacy between the legitimate source host and the destination host. Here, communication privacy means the IP addresses of the communication pair.
We propose a confirmation procedure capable of distinguishing a spoofing or non-spoofing packet while retaining privacy from non-participant domains. With this in mind, we use the hash value to conceal the IP address: since the combination of the source IP address and the destination FQDN can generate a sufficiently large number of hash values, the hash value is calculated from the source IP address and the destination FQDN.
The destination host can calculate the hash value using the source IP address of the attack packet and the destination FQDN. Also, in the case of a non-spoofing attack, the source DNS server receiving the DNS query from the attacker can calculate the same hash value using the source IP address of the attacker and the destination FQDN. On the other hand, in the case of a spoofing attack, the source DNS server receives the DNS query from a legitimate source IP address but the source IP address of the attack packet is spoofed. The source DNS server is unable to calculate the same hash value using the source IP address of the DNS query and the destination FQDN. Figure 11 shows a procedure of spoofing/nonspoofing confirmation, while retaining communication privacy.
1. When the destination host receives the attack packets, the hash value calculated from the source IP address of the attack packet zzz.zzz.zzz.zzz and destination FQDN www.kddi.com is sent to the destination DNS server as a confirmation request. 2. The destination DNS server inspects its recursive DNS events to extract the source DNS server, which resolves www.kddi.com. Subsequently, the confirmation request, as calculated from zzz.zzz.zzz.zzz and www.kddi.com, is sent to the source DNS servers. 3. The source DNS server calculates the hash value using its recursive DNS events. If the same hash value can be calculated, the source IP address of the attack packet is considered to be nonspoofing. If the same hash value cannot be calculated, the source IP address of the attack packet is considered to be spoofing. The confirmation result is replied to the destination DNS server. 4. The destination DNS server relays the confirmation result to the destination host. 
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the end-to-end tracking success rate and the recording load of the DNS server log.
A. End-to-End Tracking Success Rate
First, we investigated the end-to-end routing path hops on the Internet [11] - [13] . Consequently, we estimated the average end-to-end routing path hops to be 15 as of May, 2008. In the case of a conventional IP tracking scheme, the endto-end tracking success rate is calculated as the power of the success rate per hop [5] . Here, the success rate per hop means the probe installation rate on each router. In the case of the proposed IP tracking scheme, the end-to-end tracking success rate is calculated as the square of the success rate per hop times the DNS query rate of the bot. Figure 12 shows the endto-end tracking success rate versus the tracking hop length. Here, the success rate per hop is p=0.9. The end-to-end tracking success rate of the conventional scheme decreases quickly, because the rate is followed by the power of the success rate per hop. On the other hand, the end-to-end tracking success rates of the proposed scheme are constant values at more than 2 hops. At the 15 hops, the end-to-end tracking rates of the conventional scheme, the proposal of the DNS query rate = 0.55, and the proposal of the DNS query rate = 1.00 are about 0.20, 0.45, and 0.81, respectively. The proposed schemes can achieve a higher end-to-end success rate than the conventional scheme at more than 3 or 8 routing hops.
End-to-end Tracking Success Ratio Figure 12 . End-to-end Tracking Success Rate versus Tracking Hops.
B. Output Load of the DNS Log
The proposed scheme can track bots when the DNS servers output the DNS logs. Thus, we evaluated the CPU load of the DNS server with and without the DNS log output. Figure 13 shows the CPU load of the DNS server, with the server specification as follows: Intel Xeon 3.6GHz dual-CPU, 4.0 Gbyte memory, Linux 2.4.21-27.0.1.ELsmp, and a BIND 9.2.4-5 EL3 DNS server. We use a traffic generator capable of emulating DNS queries. All the queries from the traffic generator are hit with a DNS cache on the server, while the average CPU load is monitored by the vmstat command for 30 seconds. The CPU loads with the outputting DNS log are about 1% and 2% larger than the loads without outputting DNS log at 100 and 1,000 queries/sec, respectively. This means that the CPU load of the source and destination DNS servers will not be a critical problem when the DNS query log is output. It is easy to apply the IP tracking scheme using a DNS log to the Internet.
VI. FURTHER STUDIES
A. IP Traceback Using DNS Logs against C&C Servers
In our further study, we consider how to track the C&C servers using DNS logs. Table 1 shows that most bots retrieved the IP addresses of the C&C servers, hence the recursive DNS log of the source DNS server records the DNS query used to retrieve the C&C server from the bots. Figure 14 shows the IP tracking scheme against the C&C servers using the source and destination DNS logs. The procedures involved in the IP tracking request are almost identical to those of the bot tracking schemes, while the inspection procedures of the recursive DNS events at the source DNS server are as follows:
-If the IP address of the bot yyy.yyy.yyy.yyy is detected in the source DNS log, the previous recursive records of the bot IP yyy.yyy.yyy.yyy are extracted. -The destination IP address of the recursive records ccc.ccc.ccc.ccc indicates the C&C server. The source DNS server passed on the previous recursive records to the destination DNS server.
If the bot infected host is controlled by the user, various DNS query events are recorded in the source DNS server logs. It is difficult to distinguish between user and bot queries respectively and further study will be required to ensure a reliable extraction procedure. 
B. Investigation of the DNS Query Rate
When a destination FQDN is hit on a cache list of the source DNS server, the DNS query is not exchanged between the source and the destination DNS servers. Our scheme will be unable to track a source host if the DNS query from the source DNS server is not recorded in the destination DNS log. We will investigate the DNS query rate from the source to the destination DNS servers.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this research, we proposed an IP tracking scheme against the bots using the DNS logs. Also, we consider how to distinguish spoofing from non-spoofing attacks, and how to ensure reliable tracking results. Our scheme is easy to apply on the Internet because the DNS server log can be substituted for conventional IP tracking probes. The end-to-end tracking success rate of the proposed scheme is higher than the conventional scheme when the routing path length is considerable. The CPU load of the DNS sever that outputs the DNS events is relatively light. Our scheme is expected for tracking the IP spoofing packet from the bots. In addition, the C&C server is also tracked by extracting anomaly events on the source DNS log.
